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It is argued that if we compute self-other agreement on some personality traits then
we possess no or very little information about the individuals who are the targets of
this judgment. This idea is largely based on two separate ways of computing self-other
agreement: trait agreement (rT ) and profile agreement (rP), which are typically associated
with two different trait-centered and person-centered approaches in personality research.
Personality traits of 4115 targets from Czech, Belgian, Estonian, and German samples
were rated by themselves and knowledgeable informants. We demonstrate that trait
agreement can be partialled into individual contributions so that it is possible to show
how much each individual pair of judges contributes to agreement on a particular
trait. Similarly, it is possible to decompose agreement between two personality profiles
into the individual contributions of traits from which these profiles are assembled. If
normativeness is separated from distinctiveness of personality scores and individual
profiles are ipsatized, then mean profile agreement rP becomes identical to mean
trait agreement rT . The views that trait-by-trait analysis does not provide information
regarding accuracy level of a particular pair of judges and profile analysis does not permit
assessment of the relative contributions of traits to overall accuracy are not supported.
Keywords: self-other agreement, trait-centered approach, variable-centered approach, Asendorpf’s index, Rank
Consistency Index
Introduction
Personality judgments may reflect not only the traits by which a specific target individual can
be distinguished from other targets but also stereotypes, biases, and method-specific variance
(Cronbach and Gleser, 1953; Cronbach, 1955). Since between-rater agreement on personality trait
ratings allows us to separate some of the different components of ratings, the use of multiple
informants has become one of the most valuable tools in personality research (McCrae, 1994;
Funder, 1999; Kenny et al., 2006; Vazire, 2006; Borkenau and Zaltauskas, 2009; Kandler et al., 2010;
De Los Reyes et al., 2013). It has even been claimed that other-ratings are a more valid source
of information than self-ratings when it comes to the relationship between personality traits and
some external validity criteria (Kolar et al., 1996; Connelly and Ones, 2010). In any case, agreement
between judges is a precondition for a property to really exist. For instance, if two judges disagree
about the judged trait, they cannot both be right. At least one of them is wrong and it is likely that
they both are mistaken (Funder, 1999). Thus, agreement is necessary for the accuracy of judgments
of personality traits.
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Two Principal Ways to Compute Agreement
One problem in personality research is that there are two
principal ways of computing agreement between the judgments
of multiple informants. Typically, data are collected concerning
N targets who are rated, in addition to themselves, by one
or several judges on exactly the same set of K personality
traits. Agreement is calculated as a correlation between pairs
of informants, the self and a knowledgeable other, in their
rank-order position on each individual trait (Biesanz and West,
2000). Thus, trait agreement (rT) is computed separately for each
of K personality traits across all N pairs of judges. Although
researches may be interested in a single trait (K = 1), the unit
of the analysis is still traits rather than individuals. This is
why it is called the variable-centered (trait-by-trait) approach
(Magnusson and Torestäd, 1993; Bergman and Trost, 2006; Furr,
2009).
Another approach concentrates on a specific individual who,
besides her- or himself, is also judged by one or several judges.
This method correlates ratings of two judges of a given target
across K personality traits. Since the focus of this approach is
the similarity between two (or sometimes more) trait profiles,
this form of agreement is called profile agreement (rP). Because
agreement is calculated across K personality traits for each
individual target-judge pair, it is often called the person-centered
(person-by-person) approach (Bernieri et al., 1994; Funder, 1997,
1999; Bergman and Trost, 2006).
Generally, for most personality traits, informants tend to
achieve at least moderate cross-observer agreement (Watson
et al., 2000; Connolly et al., 2007; Connelly and Ones, 2010;
Kenny and West, 2010). For example, the median cross-observer
trait agreement in a number of studies using measures of
the Five-Factor model was 0.40 or higher on all the Big Five
personality dimensions (McCrae et al., 2004). Almost identical
levels of self-other agreement were found in North American and
cross-cultural samples (McCrae et al., 2004). The mean profile
agreement across all target-informant pairs has been shown to
be in the same range or even higher than for trait agreement
(Pelham, 1993; Kenny and Winquist, 2001; McCrae, 2008;
Borkenau and Zaltauskas, 2009; Allik et al., 2010b; Dobewall
et al., 2013). However, there is no good explanation why both
trait and profile agreement are often around 0.40, with profile
agreement having slightly higher values. In this study, we suggest
an answer to this question.
The two methods of computing agreement—trait and profile
agreement—both have their advantages and shortcomings (e.g.,
Bernieri et al., 1994). Trait agreement may be more popular
among researchers, mainly because trait correlation is the basis
of factorial models of personality, irrespective whether we talk
about the Five-Factor Model (FFM, McCrae and Costa, 1987;
Goldberg, 1993; Allik et al., 2013) or any other of a number of
factor models (Ashton et al., 2004; Lee and Ashton, 2008; Ashton
and Lee, 2010). Analysis of covariation between personality traits
is the main method for revealing the genetic, environmental, and
error-related structure of personality measures (McCrae et al.,
2001). However, according to some researchers, personality trait
covariation models, such as the FFM, provide information that
holds true only at the level of groups or populations, and may
not provide any useful information about individuals (Borsboom,
2005). For example, it was claimed that, if a latent factor model
fits a given population, it does not necessarily fit each or even any
individual in that population (Borsboom et al., 2003; Molenaar
and Campbell, 2009). Bernieri and colleagues expressed a
similar concern: “The trait-by-trait analysis allows researchers to
determine which traits are more accurately perceived by judges
but does not lend easily to questions regarding the accuracy level
of a particular judge” (Bernieri et al., 1994, p. 370). Thus, it is
a dominant belief that trait correlation does not provide much
information about individuals.
The study of self-informant profile congruence was once a
prolific area of research (Bruner and Tagiuri, 1954; Taft, 1955)
until Cronbach (Cronbach, 1955; Gage and Cronbach, 1955)
published a series of papers in which it was suggested that various
response components, such as “stereotype accuracy,” “elevation,”
and “differential elevation” should be differentiated and taken
into account. An unexpected effect of Cronbach’s critique was
the abolishing of nearly all research on self-other congruence for
several decades (Funder and Colvin, 1997). This was an unusual
turn of events, as Funder and Colvin keenly observed, where
the scientific community simply panicked instead of adopting
basic techniques to separate, for example, the distinctiveness of
personality profiles (differential accuracy) from normativeness
or stereotypes (Gage and Cronbach, 1955; Bernieri et al., 1994;
Furr, 2008; Borkenau and Zaltauskas, 2009). Although profile
agreement is considerably more subject to distortions than
trait agreement, there are relatively simple ways to ameliorate
the situation. Many of these techniques were suggested in
papers with dramatic consequences (Cronbach and Gleser, 1953;
Cronbach, 1955; Gage and Cronbach, 1955). Unlike trait-by-
trait analysis, profile analysis generates an accuracy score for
each target-informant pair. At the same time, profile analysis,
as is typically believed, “does not permit us to assess the
relative contributions of traits (or items) to overall accuracy”
(Bernieri et al., 1994, p. 370).
Nevertheless, profile analysis has a clear advantage over
calculating agreement within traits—that is, its statistical power
(Borkenau and Zaltauskas, 2009). For example, the statistical
power required to establish a correlation between two traits in
a sample of 300 participants is equal to the power required
to establish this correlation across 30 traits among just 11
participants (Borkenau and Zaltauskas, 2009). Obviously, such a
gain in power is highly desirable.
Although trait and profile agreement are both legitimate ways
to estimate self-other congruence, there is very little empirical or
theoretical information about how these two forms of agreement
are related to one another. Common sense, but not so many
empirical studies, would suggest that trait- and profile-agreement
have something in common. Usually, the mean values of both, as
already mentioned, are in the same range (0.40 or higher). On the
other hand, there is plenty of evidence that these two forms of
agreement have substantively different interpretations, implying
that they are not interchangeable (Bernieri et al., 1994; Kenny and
Winquist, 2001; Connelly and Ones, 2010). The view that trait
and profile agreement may have no substantial overlap is also
strengthened by easily constructed examples of at least apparent
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disassociation between these two forms of agreement. It is easy to
envision an artificial example where a correlation between two
personality profiles is zero. For instance, although it is rather
unlikely that one would obtain equal scores on all personality
traits, it is still possible and perfectly compatible with many
personality models (Allik et al., 2012). Should this happen, there
would be no variance within these personality profiles and, as a
result, self-other agreement is zero. At the same time, targets and
their informants may report very similar or even identical levels
on these personality traits, resulting in high trait correlations.
Conversely, it is possible to imagine trait correlations which are
only insignificantly different from zero, based on a considerable
number of dyads who report similar profiles. In conclusion, these
two—person-centered and variable-centered—approaches have
sometimes revealed similar, and sometimes dissimilar, findings
(Furr, 2009, p. 203).
The Present Study
The aim of the present study is to examine the relationship
between trait and profile agreement and, by doing so, to
extend the existing literature on the topic in a substantial
way. The starting point is the observation that both trait
and profile agreement are computed from precisely the same
data (Furr, 2009, p. 203). Analyzing cross-situational behavioral
contingencies (the same set of traits was measured repeatedly),
Furr noticed that a profile approach can be combined with
a more traditional trait-centered approach (Furr, 2009). In
particular, he demonstrated that, in terms of covariation, one
form of agreement is directly related to another by sharing
some common components of covariation (Furr, 2009, Appendix
A in Supplementary Material). In this study, we followed this
approach and noticed that formulas for the trait rT and profile
correlation rP (see Appendix A in Supplementary Material)
contain the same member—the product of self- and other-
rated scores—which makes these two correlations inevitably
dependent on each other. This dependence between trait and
profile correlations becomes obvious when Pearson correlations
are computed as means of the products of standard scores. We
also demonstrate in the Appendix A in Supplementary Material
that standardization of personality scores makes the difference
between mean trait agreement rT (averaged across all traits)
and mean profile agreement rP (averaged across all self-other
dyads) predictably smaller. For example, if personality scores are
double standardized by setting all trait means and all person
means to zero, and all trait and person standard deviations
to one, the mean trait rT and the mean profile rP agreement
become identical. Thus, if we eliminate all differences between
traits and profiles caused by elevation or scatter, then it does not
matter whether we compute the mean trait or profile agreement.
Consequently, for double-standardized z-scores, there is only one
measure of average self-other agreement, irrespective of whether
we start from traits or from individual profiles (see Appendix B
in Supplementary Material for an example).
Another way to analyze relationships between trait and profile
correlations is to decompose self-other agreement on traits into
individual pairs’ contributions to this correlation (Asendorpf,
1992; Allik et al., 2010b). Asendorpf (1990, 1992) proposed a
simple mathematical method for partialling the Pearson product
moment correlation between two variables into the contributions
of the individual dyads to this overall correlation. The proposed
coefficient of individual consistency IXY , which characterizes each
individual XY pair, was defined so that their mean value across
all pairs was identical with the correlation at the aggregate level
(Asendorpf, 1990). Using certain well-known properties of z-
transformed variables, the index of individual consistency can be
expressed as a linear function of the squared differences of the z-
scores of the two variables: IXY = 1 - (zX - zY )
2/2, where zX and
zY are z-scores of the two paired variables X and Y (Asendorpf,
1990).
This index articulates the transparent idea that dyads whose
members occupy approximately the same position in their
respective rankings contribute strongly to the overall correlation,
whereas members of dyads who occupy very different ranking
positions contribute less, or even contribute negatively, to the
overall correlation. Evidently, the disparity between individual
rankings of dyad members is inversely proportional to the
overall correlation. However, something that would limit the
applicability of this idea is if variables X and Y do not
perfectly meet the requirements for correlation as a measure of
stochastic relation: For example, they deviate from the normal
distribution by being strongly skewed or distorted in some way
or another. Usually, particular transformations (e.g., Fisher’s
z-transformation) are recommended to restore normality of
distributions.
Another possibility is to devise a new index of individual
consistency which relies on ranking information only. For
example, Spearman’s rank correlation ρ (rho) measures statistical
dependence between two paired variables X and Y based on
their ranks. As a direct analogy with Asendorpf ’s individual
index of consistency IXY , we can propose a non-parametric Rank
Consistency Index (RnkCI) ρXY = 1 − 6·(rX - rY )
2/(N2− 1),
where rX and rY are the ranks of the respective values on variables
X and Y and N is the number of pairs. It is important to note
that the mean value of ρXY across all N pairs is identical to the
Spearman rank correlation ρ at the aggregate level. Thus, ρXY
demonstrates how strongly each individual pair contributes to
the overall correlation of some trait. If we average ρXY across all
K personality traits, then we can find the mean RnkCI ρXY which
characterizes how consistent ranks of self- and other-ratings
across all K personality traits are. One obvious advantage of
RnkCI is that it is based onmuch less restrictive assumptions than
the Pearson product-moment correlation. The only underlying
assumption of RnkCI is preservation of a monotonic relation.
Knowing the mean RnkCI (ρXY) characterizing each
individual dyad, we can compare it with the profile correlation
rP computed across K traits for individual pairs. Profile
agreement(rP) starts from individual target-judge pairs,
measuring agreement between their two profiles. Obviously, rP
can be averaged across multiple target-judge pairs, resulting in
rP. To the best of our knowledge, so far nobody has compared
ρXY and rP. If these two indices (rPand ρXY) are related to each
other, this would disconfirm the view that person-centered and
trait-centered analyses result in radically different findings on
self-other agreement.
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Some researchers have criticized the fact that results from
the majority of psychological research have little relevance to
the majority of the world (Berry et al., 2002), since they study
predominantly WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialized,
Rich, and Democratic) people (Henrich et al., 2010a,b; Jones,
2010). Indeed, a recent survey of the top psychological journals
found that 96% of all research participants were from Western
industrialized countries, the majority of whom spoke English
as their mother tongue (Henrich et al., 2010b). In this study,
however, we emphasize generalizability of the results from one
language and culture to another. We compare four historically
and culturally sufficiently different European samples with the
aim of replicating findings across all of them.
Methods
Measures
All participants in this study completed either the Revised
NEO Personality Inventory (NEO-PI-R; McCrae and Costa,
2010) or the NEO Personality Inventory-3 (NEO-PI-3; McCrae
et al., 2005), which is a slightly modified version of the NEO-
PI-R. Questions and wording in the NEO-PI-3 were altered
to be more understandable to participants, to increase the
accuracy of responses. Both versions use a five-point Likert scale
ranging from “Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree.” Like the
original NEO-PI-R, the NEO-PI-3 has 240 items that measure 30
personality facets, which are grouped into the five FFM domains,
such that each domain score is a composite of six facet scores.
The NEO-PI-R/NEO-PI-3 has excellent psychometric properties
across a wide range of languages and countries, including those
which were included in the present study (De Fruyt et al., 2009).
Participants
In total, there were 8230 participants in this study—4115
targets and 4115 knowledgeable informants from four different
samples—Czech, Belgian (Flemish), Estonian, and German.
Czech Sample
The Czech sample included 808 targets (329 men, 479 women)
who were recruited in a series of studies (McCrae et al., 2004).
They ranged in age from 14 to 83 years, with a mean age
of 35.7 (SD = 14.2 years). Raters came from different study
schemes, which were explained in our previous paper (Allik et al.,
2010a). All participants used the Czech version of the NEO PI-R
questionnaire (Hrˇebícˇková, 2002).
Estonian Sample
Participants for the present study came from the Estonian
Biobank cohort, for which data were collected by the Estonian
Genome Centre (EGC) at the University of Tartu (Leitsalu et al.,
2014). In the Estonian sample, 2658 participants (1455 women
and 1203 men) with a mean age of 46.0 years (SD= 17.3, ranging
from 18 to 91 years) completed the self-report version of the
Estonian NEO Personality Inventory-3. All 2658 participants
nominated somebody who knew them well. Those who were
nominated were asked to rate the personality traits of the specific
target using the other-report version of the Estonian NEO-PI-3.
Of the informants, 1845 were women (72.2%) and 723 were men.
The mean age of informants was 42.6 (SD= 24.1) years.
Flemish Sample
Flemish data were collected from 345 target participants
(270 women and 75 men) who were psychology students
at the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven and who, as a course
requirement, rated their own personality with the Dutch version
of the NEO PI-R (Hoekstra et al., 1996). They also recruited a
well-acquainted person (n = 345; 190 women, 112 men, and
43 did not specify sex), either a relative or a friend, who rated
their personality using the observer-report form of the same
instrument. The mean age of targets was 18.4 (SD = 3.0) years.
The mean age of external raters was 29.5 (SD= 13.7) years.
German Sample
Participants were 304 students (169 women, 134 men, and 1 not
reporting sex) at a German university, of whom only 3 studied
psychology (Borkenau and Zaltauskas, 2009). Their mean age
was 23.38 (SD = 2.68) years, ranging from 18 to 35 years. They
received 45 euros for their participation and were recruited in 76
groups, each comprising four persons who all knew each other
well. Each four-person group was split into two dyads and all
participants described themselves and the other dyad member on
several personality inventories including the German version of
the NEO PI-R (Ostendorf and Angleitner, 2004).
The Czech, Flemish, and German samples have also been used
in our previous studies (Allik et al., 2010a, 2012; Borkenau et al.,
2013a).
Normativeness and Distinctiveness of
Personality Profiles
Personality profiles reflect at least two different components—
normativeness and distinctiveness (Cronbach, 1955; Furr, 2008;
Borkenau and Zaltauskas, 2009). Profile normativeness is the
degree to which a profile reflects an average profile—the
similarity between an individual’s profile of scores and a group’s
normative profile of scores. Profile distinctiveness is how much
the individual is above or below average scores on each
trait (Furr, 2008; Borkenau and Zaltauskas, 2009). Personality
researchers are primarily interested in profile distinctiveness
because uniqueness, not stereotypes, is their main concern. In
addition it was demonstrated that self-enhancement and social
desirability responding have very little influence on distinctive
self-other agreement (Borkenau and Zaltauskas, 2009). Thus,
in order to get distinctive profiles, all personality data were
standardized traitwise by converting them into z-scores. In the
Czech and Estonian data, standardization took place separately
for four groups of participants (men and women, each divided
into two groups: one younger and one older than 30 years). Here,
the raw scores on all thirty personality facets were transformed
so that a new score of zero represented the mean for each
of the four separate groups and a difference of one from
the mean indicated a difference of one standard deviation.
Normalization was done separately for self-ratings and observer-
ratings on the basis of the target age and sex. Besides eliminating
practically all normativeness from profiles, this normalization
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also eliminates a large portion of variance caused either by
age or sex differences. Since participants from the Belgian and
German samples were, on average, relatively young, their data
were standardized separately for sex only.
Measures of Profile Agreement
Researchers have proposed various indices measuring the level
of agreement between two personality profiles, including Cattell’s
Index, McCrae’s Index, Intraclass correlation, and several others
(McCrae, 1993, 2008; Furr, 2010). All of these various measures,
however, are similar to the Pearson product moment correlation,
because they estimate similarity of shapes as one of their
components. It is not surprising that, usually, the Pearson
r performs nearly as accurately as other measures of profile
agreement (McCrae, 2008). In addition to its essential simplicity,
it is important to note that the Pearson r does not depend on
the specific measurement units used. If one of the profiles is
affected by an elevation or differential elevation, then, as soon as
these two profiles are linearly invariant to each other, the Pearson
r regards them as identical. Based on these considerations, we




We began by computing profile agreements rP between self- and
other-ratings for all 4115 participating dyads. Expectedly, when
we used raw scores, mean profile correlations were relatively high
(Table 1, first row). The mean value across all four samples was
0.57 (see the last column). When distinctiveness was separated
from normativeness (by standardizing scores), profile agreement
dropped by 0.16 points, on average. This suggests that distinctive
agreement accounted for approximately 77, 73, 70, and 70%
of overall profile agreement in the Czech, Estonian, Flemish,
and German samples, respectively. However, individual profile
correlations based on standardized scores were not always lower
than those relying on raw scores. For 15.1% (Estonian sample) to
21.7% (Flemish sample) of all dyads, profile correlations based
on standardized scores were higher, not lower, than the same
correlation based on raw scores.
Analogously to standardizing scores trait- or column-wise,
it is also possible to standardize scores person- or row-wise.
Sometimes this type of standardization is called ipsatization,
which is useful for eliminating peculiarities in a rater’s style of
responding (e.g., preference for one part of the response scale).
As a result of ipsatization, the mean is zero, and the standard
deviation is one, for each person. To standardize scores trait-wise
and person-wise simultaneously, it may be necessary to iterate
the standardization procedure along columns and rows several
times to obtain column and row means and standard deviations
sufficiently close to zero and one, respectively. The third row
in Table 1 reports mean profile correlations based on double-
normalized scores for our four samples. Obviously, these profile
correlations are very similar to those in the previous row.
Trait Agreement
Next, we computed self-other agreement for all NEO-PI facet
scales. It should be noted that linear transformations of trait
variables (adding, and multiplying by, a constant) do not affect
their correlation. Figure 1 demonstrates the trait agreement
values (Pearson rT) in our four samples for all 30 NEO-
PI traits. The shape of these four profiles is similar: Their
correlations across facets vary from 0.51 (Czech vs. Flemish)
to 0.73 (Flemish vs. Estonian), suggesting that the pattern of
agreement is generalizable from one language and/or culture
to another. This indicates that individuals and their informants
agree on some traits more than on others. For example, E3:
Assertiveness is a trait on which it is easy to agree (average rT =
0.56), whereas perceptions of self and informant on O6: Values
agree least (average rT = 0.32). The mean agreement across
all traits varied from 0.32 (Germany) to 0.47 (Estonia), which is
quite consistent with previously reported values (McCrae et al.,
2004).
It is perhaps interesting to mention that it made little
difference whether the Spearman rank-order correlation or the
Pearson r was used. Self-other trait correlations computed on
ranks were, on average, only slightly smaller than the Pearson
correlations.
Rank Consistency Index
Next, we decomposed self-other trait correlations into
contributions by individual dyad, using the RnkCI, and
computing ρXY -values for all 4115 dyads. As expected, the
mean ρXY-values (across all traits) were similar to the profile
correlations of the same self-other dyads. The correlations
between ρXY and rP were 0.75, 0.79, 0.51, and 0.67 for the Czech,
Estonian, Flemish, and German samples, respectively. Although
these correlations are relatively high, there is still a fair amount
of freedom until a complete congruence. We therefore checked
whether these correlations got higher by aggregating them over
a sufficient number of occurrences (Epstein, 1979, 1980). We
TABLE 1 | Mean profile correlations and Rank Consistency Indices for the four samples.
Mean profile correlations and consistency indices Sample Average
Czech Estonian Flemish German
Pearson rP (raw data) 0.58 0.61 0.53 0.54 0.57
Pearson rP standardized traitwise 0.45 0.45 0.37 0.37 0.41
Pearson rP standardized trait- and personwise 0.46 0.46 0.37 0.37 0.42
Rank Consistency Index ρXY 0.45 0.46 0.40 0.38 0.42
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FIGURE 1 | Profiles of self-other trait correlations for the Czech, Estonian, Flemish, and German samples.
divided all samples into 10 approximately equal-sized groups on
the basis on their profile agreement values rP. Figure 1 displays
the mean values of profile correlation (rP) and the mean RnkCI
(ρXY) for these 10 groups.
Except for very few deviating points, the relationship is almost
perfectly linear, suggesting that, if random noise is suppressed,
profile correlations can be rather accurately predicted frommean
differences in the ranking on personality traits. The correlation
between the data points is 0.96 (p < 0.0001). If the individual
(X) and the informant (Y) report sufficiently similar ranks on all,
or at least many, personality traits, the two profiles are similar as
well. The effects of aggregation show thatmost of the unexplained
variance is indeed random because it is canceled out by the
aggregation.
Contribution of Traits to Profile Agreement
We can also ask what each trait contributes to the self-informant
profile correlation. Let us suppose that, in each individual profile,
scores are replaced by their ranks: The NEO-PI facet scale
scoring the highest receives a rank of one. The next highest
score receives a rank of 2, and so on, until the lowest score
receives a rank of 30. Self and informant scores are ranked
separately. Now the difference between ranks for self- and other-
ratings determines how much this particular trait contributes
to the overall profile correlation. Traits which have identical
or similar ranks in self and informant profiles contribute more
strongly to profile correlation than those traits which have a large
discrepancy between ranks. Thus, we can apply the same Rank
Consistency Index or RnkCI ρXY to evaluate how much each trait
contributes to profile correlations.
For each individual dyad, we found 30 ρXY-values, each
showing how much a particular trait contributed to the profile
correlation. After that, we computed the mean consistency value
ρXYf for each trait by averaging scores across allN self-informant
pairs in each of our four samples. This averaged RnkCI indicates
how much this particular personality trait contributes to the
profile correlation averaged across all participants in that sample.
This allows us to check if the contributions of that trait to profile
agreement are related to the self-other agreement rT for that trait
(as reported in Figure 2). The correlation between ρXY and rT
was 0.79, 0.80, 0.54, and 0.87 for Czech, Estonian, Flemish, and
German samples, respectively. For greater clarity, we illustrate
the relationship between ρXY and rT for the combined sample
of 4115 targets in Figure 3.
This figure shows that traits showing higher self-other
agreement are the same traits as those contributing significantly
to the self-other profile correlations. The average correlation
between contributions to profile agreement (ρXY) and rT was
sufficiently high, r = 0.78, p < 0.0001. For example, E3:
Assertiveness, C2: Order, and O2: Aesthetics are high on both
axes. At the same time, N4: Self-Contentiousness, O6: Ideas,
and A2: Straightforwardness contributed relatively modestly to
both measures of agreement. Nevertheless, it is useful to note
that both values are in a relatively narrow corridor, somewhere
around the value 0.40. This means that relatively good agreement
is achievable on all traits without clear distinctions between
dimensions that are more or less judgeable.
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FIGURE 2 | Relationship between average profile correlation (rP) and
average RnkCI (ρXY), when samples were divided into 10 groups of
equal size on the basis of their profile correlations.
FIGURE 3 | The relationship between traitwise self-informant
agreement and the contribution of the trait to the average profile
correlation.
Discussion
As a result of this study, it is perhaps time to say goodbye to
two still widely held misconceptions. One of them is the belief
that trait correlations (or trait-by-trait analysis in general) do
not provide information on the agreement between individual
judge pairs. Similarly, it was considered self-evident that profile
analysis does not permit assessment of the relative contributions
of traits to overall accuracy (Bernieri et al., 1994, p. 370).
Asendorpf (1990) proposed, already 25 years ago, a simple
idea for decomposing the overall Pearson correlation into the
individual contributions of each of the pairs of scores from
which a correlation is computed. The proposed consistency
index IXY implements the intuitively transparent idea that those
pairs which occupy approximately the same ranks on the trait
continuum contribute strongly to the overall correlation, whereas
those members of the dyads that occupy very different ranking
positions contribute less, or negatively, to the overall trait
correlation. To implement this basic intuition more literally and
to overcome the limitations of the Asendorpf index, we proposed
the Rank Consistency Index ρXY or RnkCI, which is proportional
to the squared difference between the ranks of self-ratings and of
informant ratings on a given trait. More precisely, the mean value
of individual indicesρXY is equal to the overall Spearman ρ being
computed on the same ranks. Thus, the RnkCI indicates how
much a particular judge pair contributed to that trait correlation.
Similarly, we can decompose self-other profile correlations into
the relative contributions of each trait. It is surprising that
these mathematically elementary ideas were, to the best of our
knowledge, never applied to self-other agreement.
We demonstrated, for the first time, that there are two
alternative ways to determine which traits are perceived more
consensually by judges. One usual way is to compute self-
other correlations trait by trait. From such analyses, we learned
that those traits that were perceived more consensually in one
culture were also perceived more consensually in the other
samples under study. For some reason, E3: Assertiveness, C2:
Order, and O2: Aesthetics showed high self-other agreement in
all four samples. Although sufficient agreement was achieved
on all 30 personality traits being studied, self-other agreement
was lower for self-consciousness, openness to new ideas, and
straightforwardness. However, when inspecting the traits which
contributed more to individual profile correlations the same
pattern emerged. Aggregating consistency indices across all
dyads, it turned out that the rank differences were smaller for
those traits on which higher self-other agreement was obtained.
In turn, rank consistency was relatively small (ranks were
different) for assertiveness, order, and openness to aesthetics, on
which trait agreement was harder to obtain.
Similarly, there are two alternative approaches for deciding
which of all participating dyads agrees more in judgment of
personality. Computing correlations between profiles of self- and
other-ratings reveals dyads which reach high, intermediate, or
low agreement. An alternative way to find dyads excelling in self-
other agreement is to take differences in the ranks that members
of the same dyad occupy on all personality traits into account.
As we demonstrated, these two alternative ways of characterizing
dyad agreement converge strongly. The correlation between
profile agreement rP and rank consistency ρXY was in the
range of 0.51 (Flemish sample) to 0.79 (Estonian sample). One
can complain, of course, that correlations such as 0.51 are
not very impressive, leaving plenty of room for psychologically
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meaningful differences between these two ways of characterizing
agreement. This argument appears to carry even more weight
knowing that the use of the original Asendorpf index IXY ,
instead of ρXY, led to similar, but lower, convergence. However,
the aggregation test we applied demonstrated that the main
problem was that the dyad was too small as a unit of analysis
to obtain reliable findings. If the unit of analysis comprised a
sufficient number of occurrences, these two alternative ways of
computing within-dyad agreement converged very nicely, leaving
approximately 8% of variance unexplained. Not denying that
even 8% of variance can have a psychologically meaningful
interpretation, this is still compelling evidence that these two
alternative methods converge substantially.
We need to clarify one potential source of controversy.
In one of our previous studies, we claimed that agreement
only moderately generalizes from one personality trait to
another (Allik et al., 2010b): A reliable judge of one’s own
or a friend’s openness is not necessarily a good judge of, for
example, conscientiousness. One consequence of this lack of
generalizability is that there may be no good judges of personality
because, on the basis of how well you judge openness, it is not
possible to say how well you judge other personality traits (for the
oppoite vew, see Funder, 1997, 1999). In addition to this puzzle,
our previous results seem to contradict the present findings
that trait agreement, when decomposed into the contributions
of individual pairs of raters, correlated substantially with the
coefficients of profile agreement. A crucial difference between our
current and previous studies is in the level of analysis. Instead
of all 30 facets, in the previous study, we were interested in
domain scores only, as well as computing Asendorpf ’s index for
them. This also means that facets loading on the same dimension
are correlated more strongly with one another than with facets
which contribute to other dimensions. Since in our previous
study (Allik et al., 2010b) we observed generalizability across
dimensions, we missed generalizability between facets measuring
the same broad traits. Thus, agreement is definitely generalizable
across facets of the same trait dimension. If someone is, for
example, an accurate judge of his or her own or a friend’s anxiety,
hostility, or depression, he or she is also most likely good at
rating impulsiveness, vulnerability, or self-consciousness, being
all different facets of neuroticism.
Even after establishing substantial convergence between two
alternative ways of estimating agreement, it remains to be
explained why some factors (e.g., length of cohabitation) can
affect, for example, trait agreement but not profile agreement
(Bernieri et al., 1994). Undoubtedly, Michael Furr was one of
first to point out the fact that, despite the meaningfulness of
both approaches, they emerge from precisely the same data (Furr,
2009, p. 203). He was, however, probably mistaken when he
claimed that the connection between trait-centered and person-
centered approaches cannot be drawn clearly on a correlational
metric (Furr, 2009, p. 203). As we demonstrate in the Appendix
A in Supplementary Material, the connection between trait
and profile correlations becomes obvious when the Pearson
correlations are expressed as the means of the products of
the standard scores. Expressing the profile (rP) and trait (rT)
correlation through the product of the standard scores makes
it evident that these two formulas share a common term—the
product of the self- and other-rated scores. This means that there
is a direct link between these two forms of agreement, which
makes them dependent on each other. Even if there is no strict
one-to-one relationship, there has to be a positive association
between these two forms of correlations.
Personality psychologists are rarely interested in the
normativeness component in personality profiles—how much
a given person is similar to an average or prototypic person of
the group to which he or she belongs. Personality researchers
are usually interested in the distinctiveness component of
judgments, which show how much the individual is above or
below average on each trait. One of the most common ways to
measure this is to standardize data by subtracting the sample
mean from each score and dividing the result by the standard
deviation of that sample. This yields a standardized variable
with a zero mean and unit variance. If we compute the Pearson
r between two standardized variables, then the result is simply
equal to the mean product of these standardized scores. This
leads to the conclusion that, if personality data are double
standardized (all means of columns and rows are equal to zero
with a unit standard deviation), then the mean profile correlation
rP (averaged across all pairs of judges) is equal to the mean trait
correlation rT (averaged across all traits). This also provides an
explanation as to why some factors can affect trait agreement but
not profile agreement, or vice versa. This can happen only when
traits differ in their levels of elevation and/or their variances.
Another possibility is that individual profiles have different
levels of elevation and/or different scatter patterns of scores
within profiles. Usually, these factors are considered artifacts and
controlled by standardization. For example, differential scatter of
profiles is typically perceived as being produced by a rater’s style
of responding, not the judged traits themselves. To get rid of
differences in response styles, it is recommended to use ipsatized
profiles. As a result, differences between variable-centered and
person-centered approaches almost vanish.
This conclusion has consequences for the long-lasting
debate about the merits of person-by-person and trait-by-trait
approaches to personality (Magnusson and Torestäd, 1993;
Pelham, 1993; Bernieri et al., 1994; Asendorpf, 2000; Bergman
and Trost, 2006; Furr, 2009). Our position is more in line
with those authors who do not think that it is important
whether we start our analysis from traits or from the individual
(Asendorpf, 2000; Furr, 2009). It is also not the case, as we have
already mentioned, that trait-by-trait analysis does not provide
information regarding the accuracy of a particular judge, and
that profile analysis does not permit assessment of the relative
contributions of traits to overall accuracy. Because trait and
profile agreement are related, studying traits has substantial
implications for the individuals being studied. At the same time,
focusing on individuals has substantial implications for traits, for
example, whether they are perceived consensually.
WhenMcCrae and Costa (1997) proposed the bold hypothesis
that the pattern of covariation among personality traits may be
a human universal, they had to rely on only six translations
of the NEO Personality Inventory (NEO-PI-R), that is, into
German, Portuguese, Hebrew, Chinese, Korean, and Japanese.
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Nevertheless, data from these highly diverse cultures with
languages from five distinct language families were persuasive
enough to suggest that the observed pattern of covariation
among personality traits would be very similar when new
cultures and languages were subjected to critical examination
(McCrae and Allik, 2002). It turned out, however, that the
pattern of covariation is easily generalizable not only across
cultures and languages, but many other properties as well
(Allik et al., 2013). For example, in most cultures studied,
men vary more than women in personality (Borkenau et al.,
2013a,b). On the other hand, there is a cross-culturally
replicable pattern of differences between internal (self) and
external (informant) perspectives on the Big Five personality
traits (Allik et al., 2010a). This study extends that list,
demonstrating that there is a replicable pattern of self-other
agreement, which generalizes across four studies, cultures, and
languages.
Average self-other agreement was slightly higher in the
Estonian and Czech samples (0.46) and more modest in the
Flemish and German samples (0.36–0.37). It is, of course,
possible that this division reflects some cultural or even historical
differences. It is, however, more likely that these differences
in self-other agreement reflect differences in the demographic
composition of these samples. For instance, the Czech and
Estonian samples were not only the two largest but also the
two oldest samples. The Flemish and German participants were
mainly young students. Students are more homogenous, not only
in their age composition, but also in their level of education.
Personality differences may be smaller in such a sample of
students than in populations with a wider range of demographic
characteristics. Nevertheless, it is also possible that students were
less motivated in doing this task and, as a result, provided more
random responses. Alternatively, fellow students may not have
known their targets as well as the relatives or partners in the adult
samples. These are, of course, pure speculations. More studies
are needed to understand how demographic variables, including
culture, influence self-other agreement on personality traits.
In general, these relatively small variations between samples
do not obscure the main conclusions. If we compute self-
other agreement on some personality traits then we possess
all information we need about the individuals who are
the targets of this judgment. Analogously, we can always
decompose agreement between two personality profiles into
the individual contributions of traits from which these profiles
are assembled. The period of uncertainty that two principal
ways of computing the self-other agreement—trait and profile
agreement—sometimes reveal similar, and sometimes dissimilar,
findings is over. We know exactly when grand means of the trait
and profile agreement, rT and rP, converge into an identical value.
The elevation and scatter of some traits and profiles relative to
other traits and profiles are the only reason why the mean trait
correlation rT and the mean profilerP are not always equal.
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